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ABSTRACT 
This note serves to correct an erroneous inference regarding 
price dynamics and to graphically illustrate the importance of model 
specification in the context of a very simple and fascinating structure. 
In an earlier JPE article, Vernon Smith concluded that excess supply 
by itself was an unreliable predictor of the speed of price adjustment. 
On the basis of regression procedures applied to experimental data he
found that the potential rent to be captured exerts the dominant 
influence. Two alternative statistical procedures, a Tobit specifica­
tion and a nonparametric test, dramatically deny this inference. Excess 
supply dominates excess rent as a predicter of the rate of adjustment, 
but in fact neither Hypothesis adequately captures the random behavior 
of price movement. 
A NOTE ON 'EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION MARKETS 
AND THE WALRASIAN HYPOTHESIS'* 
Forrest Nelson 
Vernon Smith [1965) reports the results of a test of 
Walrasian versus expected rent hypotheses of price adjustment 
mechanisms in a double oral auction. On the basis of regression 
results, he rejects the former in favor of the latter. The purpose 
of this note is to point out certain statistical details which cast 
doubt on his result, suggest alternative statistical specifications 
which, when estimated, reverse the direction of the inference, and 
further to argue that neither result can be viewed as conclusive. 
Resolution awaits further detailed theory on price adjustment 
mechanisms and further emperical evidence. 
1. The Data 
The data used by Smith consisted of the series of contract 
prices Pt agreed to in a double oral auction. The market was 
experimentally controlled with a given number, NB, of buyers seeking 
to obtain an artificial commodity for later redemption at $4.20 and 
a fixed number, Ns' of sellers seeking to sell contracts for the 
commodity which they "produce" at $3. 10. Each agent was allowed to 
trade a single unit per trading period, yielding market demand and 
2 
supply schedules as illustrated in figure 1. The Equilibrium price, P0, 
[See Figure 1) 
was $3.10 in all trials while market excess supply, e = Ns -NB, varied 
between trials by design. The designed homogeniety of sellers and 
buyers implies an excess demand which is constant and independent of 
the sequence of trades, making the study particularly suitable for 
the examination of price adjustment. 
Each market session consisted of a series of trading periods 
with the design parameters held constant across periods. The session 
was terminated after apparent stabilization of contract prices. Smith 
analyzed the results from six market sessions. NB was fixed at eleven 
(11) in all six while Ns varied between sessions with two markets 
conducted at each of three values, 13, 16, and 19. The analysis 
reported here includes a seventh market with Ns = 16 reported in 
Smith [1974). In six of the seven experiments, prices had stabilized 
at $3.10 and the session was terminated after four trading periods. 
The seventh market, one with excess demand of two units, required an 
additional two periods. 
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2. Tests of alternative price adjustment hypotheses 
The two alternative adjustment hypotheses considered by 
Smith were the Walrasian model, in which the rate of price change is 
proportional to excess supply, and an excess rent hypothesis, in 
which the rate of change is proportional to excess rent. Letting et 
be the excess supply and P0 be the equilibrium price, the Walrasian 
model may be written as 1 
p
t+l Pt + Set 
p 0 
and the excess rent model is 
if right hand side > P0 
otherwise 
p
t+l 
= p
t + aet (Pt-Po) 
(1) 
(2) 
Combining the two models into one equation and adding an additive 
disturbance, Smith obtained the general stochastic formulation 
p
t+l 
= Pt + aet
(Pt-Po) +Set + 
ut (3) 
If the Walrasian hypothesis holds, a= O  while S < O, and if the excess 
rent model holds, S = 0 while a < O. 
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Using 299� observations from the seven experiments, equation 
(3) was estimated by least squares. The results, with standard errors 
in parentheses, appear in equation (4) below 
p
t+l Pt - .0230 et (Pt-3.10) + . 0011 et 
(4) 
(. 0047) ( . 00108) 
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The coefficient on the excess rent term is significant and negative 
as expected while the excess supply coefficient has the wrong sign 
and is not significantly different from zero. Thus we are led to 
reject the Walrasian model in favor of the excess rent model. 2 
Several statistical details are worthy of note. The 
apparent decrease in price change dispersion as prices converge might 
invalidate use of standard tests but would not bias the estimates. A 
more serious criticism is that serial correlation and lagged prices 
lead to inconsistent estimates. But a priori the bias could go in 
either direction. 
One problems which does lead to a bias in favor of the excess 
rent model is the exogenous price floor of $3. 10. Consider the phase 
diagrams for the two hypotheses in figure 2. 
[See Figure 2) 
Equation (3) suggests a linear model while the Walrasian hypothesis 
requires a kink at and flat segment below Pt = 3. 10 -Se. Even in a 
deterministic environmnet, observations below the kink would tend to 
flatten the linear approximation to the Walrasian phase line, that 
is to bias the results in favor or the excess rent phase line. To 
control for this bias, Smith repeated the least squares estimation of 
equation (3) after discarding those observations for which Pt+l as 
predicted by equation (4) would lie at or below $3. 10. Equation (5) 
presents estimates obtained after deleting the 76 observations with 
pt = $3.10
pt+l Pt - .0201 et (Pt-3. 10) + . 00004 et 
(5) 
(. 0067) (. 0019) 
pt+l 
p 
0 
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Thus, the sample reduction diminishes the support of the excess rent 
hypothesis slightly but does not alter the test result. 
A 
Elimination of observations with small Pt does not, however, 
eliminate the bias. With the exogenous price floor, observations 
with positive disturbance terms ut are more likely to remain in the 
sample than those with negative ut. That is, the expectation of ut 
is not zero and, worse, it varies inversely with Pt. Estimates in 
equation (5), therefore, are still biased. A formulation which appears 
to account for the censoring is the Tobit specification 
p
t+l Pt + a
et(Pt-P0
) + Bet + ut 
p 0 
if RHS > P 0 
otherwise 
(6) 
Assuming ut "IN(O,cr
2), a, B and a may be estimated by maximum 
likelihood. Such results for the sample of 299 observations appear 
in equation (7). 
p
t+l Pt-
. 00035 et(Pt-P0
) - .0077 et 
p 0 
(. 0064) (.0017) 
if RHS > P 0 
otherwise 
(7) 
The inferences drawn from this Tobit specification are the reverse of 
those from the regression model! Both terms have the hypothesized 
sign but the Walrasian coefficient is significantly negative while 
the excess rent coefficient is not. 
This last result must, however, be viewed with suspicion. 
Limited dependent variable models are not robust against 
misspecification. Unlike the least squares case, for example, even 
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heteroscedasticity causes an asymptotic bias in parameter estimates 
(see Nelson [1979]). Any one of three likely specification errors 
(nonnormal disturbances, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity) may 
bias the results and invalidate the Walrasian versus excess rent 
comparison. 
Application of the asymptotic specification test proposed 
in Nelson [1979]3 yields a test statistic of 8.064. If the 
specification of the Tobit model is correct, that statistic should 
follow an asymptotic chi square distribution with three degrees of 
freedom. Since it exceeds the 95% critical value of 7. 81 we are led 
to reject the hypothesis of correct specification. The inference 
favoring the Walrasian model on the basis of the Tobit specification 
must therefore be regarded as suspect. 
Inspection of the phase diagrams in figure 2 suggests an 
alternative nonparametric test. Since no contracts can be negotiated 
below $3.10, downward price movements must clearly be hetergeneous, 
the potential adjustment depending on current price. There is less 
reason to reject homogeneous upward movements. (There is an explicit 
ceiling of $4.20 but it was never binding. The largest observed 
contract was at $3.80). If contract prices are randomly distributed 
about the phase line such that this distribution is independent of Pt, 
the likelihood of an upward movement in prices depends only on the 
distance between the phase line and the forty five degree line for 
any given Pt. According to the Walrasian model, that distance is 
constant with respect to Pt but increases with increasing 
et. 
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According to the excess rent model, the distance increases with both 
increasing et and increasing Pt. An examination of the frequency of 
price increases at each value of et and Pt may, therefore, distinguish 
between the two theories. 4 
Specifically, the two theories imply the following 
hypotheses. By the Walrasian model we have 
Hl: 
Pr(�P > o J Pt,e ) = Pr(�P > o J P ,e ),t t t s s 
for Pt# 
Ps 
and et = 
es, 
while according to the excess rent model, we have 
Hz: Pr(�Pt > o J Pt,et) < Pr(�Pt> O J Ps,es)' 
for P > P t s 
Under both models we have 
and et e 
. 
s 
H3: Pr(�Pt > O J P ,e ) < Pr(�P > o J P ,e ),t t t s s 
for et > e s 
and P = P t s 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
Table 1 below contains the frequency of observations by 
direction of price change, current price, and level of excess supply. 
Current price categories have been collapsed to achieve numbers in 
each cell sufficient to justify the relevant Chi-square tests. 
[Table l] 
Contrasting H1 and Hz we see that a test of the Walrasian 
(H1) versus the excess rent (Hz) models amounts to a test of
independence between direction of price change and current price. 
The Chi-square test of independence can be computed at each level of 
et and aggregated over all et
. These statistics appear in the last 
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF OBSERVATIONS BY D.P, Pt AND et 
et 
p D.P ::0 o D.P > o % D.P > o XL(d.f. ) t 
z 3.10-3. 15 Zl 5 19.Z 
3.Z0-3. 35 ,35 5 lZ.5 
3.40-3. 80 Z6 8 Z3.5 
Total 8Z 18 18.0 1. 6 ( 3) 
5 3.10 30 5 14. 3
3.15-3. ZO Z6 3 10.3 
3. Z5-3. 45 17 10 37 . 0  
3. 50-3. 80 zz 6 Zl. 4 
Total 95 Z4 zo. z 7 . 3  (4) 
8 3. 10 Z7 8 ZZ. 9 
3. 15-3. Z5 zo 6 Z3.l 
3. 30-3.80 15 4 Zl. l 
Total 6Z 18 ZZ. 5 . 03 (3) 
Overall Z39 60 ZO.l 8. 9 (10) 
11 
column of Table 1. None are significantly large at a 90 percent 
confidence level. It would appear that the likelihood of a price 
increase is independent of the current price, contrary to the expected 
rent model. 
The Walrasian model fares better, but even it is not wholly 
supported by the data. The proportion of observations with rising 
prices increases with excess demand rather than decreases, contrary 
to H3. Note, though, that the x2 with 3 d.f. for independence of 
et and 6P, ignoring Pt, is . 56 so that the trend is not significant. 
It would thus appear that either the assumptions required 
of this test are violated or that neither model adequately describes 
the data. Indeed the results so contradict those from the regression 
and Tobit formulations, which detected negative effects of et on 
price changes, as to cast doubt on their validity. Inspection of the 
data suggests that the range and variance of price changes is greatest 
for the e = 8 experiments and lowest for the e = 2 experiments. This 
may simultaneously explain the contradiction and question the 
assumptions of the nonparametric test. 
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3. Summary and Conclusions 
This note applies three standard statistical procedures 
to a sample of experimental data for the purpose of distinguishing 
between two straightforward hypotheses. The results prove 
contradictory and inconclusive. In particular, it was argued that 
(a) Smith's inference favoring the excess rent model on the basis 
of regression results are suspect, (b) an alternative Tobit 
specification reverses the inference in favor of the Walrasian 
hypothesis, (c) the Tobit specification is also suspect, (d) a 
nonparametric test favors the Walrasian over the excess rent model 
but in fact rejects both, and (e) that there may be reason to question 
the results of this nonparametric test as well. 
The difficulty lies with the assumption, in all three 
formulations, that the random component of price changes is 
independent and identically distributed. Any definitive test would 
require explicit allowance for the failure of both and, moreover, 
an explicit accounting of the nature of the dependence and the 
changing distribution. Consideration of the double oral auction 
process would suggest that early in a market session there is little 
information available regarding likely success of bids or offers. 
Thus the contract prices should exhibit erratic movement. As 
information about price agreements and their trend is accumulated, 
it must be incorporated in the process generating new bids and offers 
and, therefore, contract prices. These later prices, as they stabilize 
and ultimately converge, must surely be arising from a changing 
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distribution with, specifically, less dispersion. 
None of these factors are accounted for in the tests 
performed here. Note, for example, that the regression formulation 
of equation (3) and the Tobit model given in (6) do not even allow 
for convergence to equilibrium! With ut distributed IID as assumed 
in both models and with Pt
= P0, there is a constant and substantial 
probability, namely Pr(ut > - B
et), that the next price will lie
above equilibrium. This is true even if prices have been maintained 
at P0 for many periods. Indeed the models predict that convergence, 
in the sense of sustained equilibrium prices, never occurs. A 
modification which dictates that V(ut) declines with successive 
trades might artificially correct the problem. But then questions 
of the rate and form of decline and whether its the same for all 
groups of traders arise. Indeed that decline in price dispersion 
ought to be regarded as an explicit and essential component of the 
price adjustment process itself. 
In summary, then, it would appear that, as an approximation, 
the Walrasian model is a better predictor of the rate of price 
adjustment than is the excess rent model - the rent to be captured 
does not appear to affect the adjustment speed. It is also apparent 
that the Walrasian model is itself not wholly adequate. This 
deterministic hypothesis made stochastic by the addition of an 
additive error does not fully capture the behavior of prices. Any 
definitive analysis of the rate of price adjustment must involve a 
model in which the random component is an inherent part. The 
development of such a model is beyond the scope of this note. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* 
Vernon Smith suggested the possible application of limited 
dependent variable techniques and Charles Plott provided helpful 
discussion and encouragement. Viewpoints expressed and 
responsibility for errors or omission or col!ll1lission are those of 
the author. 
The seven experiments included a total of thirty (3) trading 
periods. In all but one trading period, the maximum of eleven 
trades were observed, yielding 329 contract prices. Data is 
required on the triple (Pt, Pt+l' 
et) for each observation. 
One observation per period was dropped (the first on Pt+l and 
the last on Pt) to allow for interperiod changes, leaving 299 
observations. et is of course constant across all observations 
and trading periods for a given market. 
As noted above the sample size used here is larger than the one 
employed by Smith. He also included a constant term in all 
regression equations and scaled prices in cents. All regression 
results reported here and by Smith are qualitatively identical in 
spite of these two differences. His estimate of equation (3), 
for example, was 
pt+l Pt - . 6134 - .0226 ERt + . 2198 et
. 
(1.108) (. 0051) ( . 1952) 
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3. The test statistic is m = N(01- 00Y [V(�1)-V(�o)J-l (81- 80) 
4. 
where 01 is the observed sum of cross products between the 
dependent and independent variables, 
1 N I 
81= NL pt+l (Pt,ERt,et) ,1 
and 00 is its theoretical expectation according to the 
specification of the model and evaluated at the maximum likelihood 
estimates. Under the assumption of correct specification, both 
A 
01 and 00 are consistent and asymptotically normal so that 
A A 
�(81- 80) is also normal and m follows an asymptotic chi square 
distribution. Any of a number of misspecif ications will cause 
01 and 00 to diverge in the limit so that under this alternative 
hypothesis, m will not follow a chi square. For convenient 
implementation of the test, the model was reestimated, allowing 
for a coefficient on Pt 
. These estimates were 
pt+l 
. 969 Pt + .0055 ERt - . 0077 et. 
(. 052) (.012) ( .0017) 
Specifically the test used will be a Chi-square test for 
independence. The test is less powerful than those based on 
regression or Tobit specifications above, but its assumptions 
are weaker and it may be more robust against violation of those 
assumptions. Let Y
t be a bernoulli variable which assumes the 
value 1 if 6Pt= Pt+l 
- Pt > 0 and zero otherwise. The assumptions 
of the Chi-square test are that, under the null hypothesis, Yt 
is independently distributed with constant Pr(Yt = 1). 
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